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The issue of the effect of trade liberalization on economic growth remains 
controversial in both theoretical and empirical literature. While traditional 
international trade literature makes clear predictions about the static effect of trade on 
welfare level (Helpman and Krugman (1985)), the dynamic effects are much less 
clear. In the case of infant industries (see, for example, Krugman (1997)), protection 
from international trade flows results in higher growth rates than trade liberalization. 
On the contrary, in the world, where firm output depends on variety of intermediate 
inputs, such as in Grossman and Helpman (1991), trade liberalization will speed up 
growth. 
Import substitution was a popular paradigm of development in 1960-70, when 
the success of Japan and other East-Asian economies was attributed mainly to well-
designed protectionist policies. However, failure of Latin American and Asian 
countries, such as India, to reach high growth rates using import substitution policy, 
undermined belief in import substitution strategies. Nowadays, creating opportunities 
for economies of scale and learning-by-doing is considered less important than 
creating correct incentives for firms to develop and to improve productivity (Krueger 
(1997)). Trade liberalization became a popular recommendation to countries 
struggling to increase their growth rates. The empirical evidence of the success of 
such policies is still mixed, though (at least on the macro side). The results of studies 
such as Sachs and Warner (1995) or Edwards(1998), who claimed that trade openness 
had a positive effect on growth, were recently questioned by Rodriquez and Rodrik 
(1999), who showed that trade liberalization and trade openness, when considered in 
isolation from other structural policies, have no or even negative effect on growth. 
More convincing evidence of the importance of creating correct incentives 
comes from studies, which use micro data. A number of plant-level and industry-level 
studies, which uses data from for various countries (Tybout et. al (1995), Harrison 
(1994), Krishna and Mitra (1998), Pavcnik (1999), Lawrence(1999), etc), 
demonstrates that protection has a negative effect or no effect on plants’ productivity, 
while competition with imports and trade liberalization have a positive effect. 
Lawrence and Weinstein (1999) question the effectiveness of protectionism and 
industrial policies even in such countries as Japan and Korea, which are usually 
considered as the most successful cases of infant-industry protectionism. Their paper 
provides evidence that high growth rates in these countries were mainly caused by 
competition with imports and availability of imported inputs. 
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This paper studies the effects of trade liberalization and competition with 
imports and foreign direct investment on the productivity of Russian firms. A number 
of previous studies, including Brown and Earle (2000), and Yudaeva et al. (2003), 
demonstrated the positive effect of competition with imports and foreign direct 
investment on Russian firms. In contrast to these previous studies, this paper makes an 
attempt to decompose this effect into the effects of competition, and the effect of 
availability of foreign-produced inputs. In the case of foreign direct investment, we 
also look at the effects from foreign-owned consumers and suppliers on domestic 
firms. There are a number of case studies, which demonstrate that these effects can be 
substantial in Russia and other transition countries.1 Almonte and Resmini (2001) find 
evidence of them in Poland, but we failed to find these effects in Russia in mid-1990s 
in an earlier paper by Yudaeva et al (2003).  
Trade liberalization and the opening- up the economy for the foreign direct 
investment were among the most important features of the transition policy reforms 
package, which was begun in Russia in the early-mid 1990s. In the Soviet Union, 
international trade was monopolized by the state. Export contracts were signed by the 
state, and state committees decided upon purchases of imported goods. Due to deficits 
of most consumer goods, illegal imports were not considered a significant problem. 
Rather, the federal and the local governments were primary concerned with the 
prevention of illegal exports, which worsened the deficit problem. In the early 1990s, 
the situation changed dramatically. Firms, most of which were privatized, received 
full freedom in regards to their export and import activities.2 The so-called shuttle 
trade flourished: thousands of individuals and small firms became importers of 
consumer goods from Poland, Turkey, China and other East Asian countries. After the 
breakdown of CMEA trade, Russian exports of machinery declined, and primary 
goods started to occupy a more and more important position among Russian exports. 
Import penetration ratios increased to almost 50% in some consumer goods 
industries.3 
It is well known that the decline of production at the start of the Russian 
transition was particularly long lasting and severe even for a CIS country. Since trade 
                                                           
1 Smirnova (2002) studies the relationships of IKEA with its Russian suppliers. Earlier, the evidence of 
vertical spillovers from MacDonald’s in Russia and Volkswagen in the Czech Republic were reported 
in Keren and Ofer (2001).  
2 The government retained control functions over export of armaments, goods which can be used both 
in civilian and military purposes, and some other goods. 
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liberalization in Russia was quite pronounced, a number of economists and a large 
share of the population strongly believe that trade liberalization was one of the most 
important (if not the most important) reasons for output decline. With the prospect of 
the future WTO accession, such beliefs strengthen the position of protectionists, who 
claim that Russia is not ready for accession, and that accession in the current situation 
would bring a new wave of output decline and a dramatic increase in unemployment. 
Both Russian economists and policymakers agree that the modernization of 
Russian industry requires substantial investment. The underdeveloped financial sector 
does not allow firms to finance investment from the financial market. Therefore, it is 
often claimed that further trade liberalization would preserve and probably increase 
the non-competitiveness of the Russian industry, while increased protection would 
allow firms to accumulate necessary funds and to prepare themselves for WTO 
accession. The productivity study by the McKinsey Global Institute (1999) questioned 
this argument, and demonstrated that important productivity gains in Russia can be 
achieved with very modest investment. The McKinsey study also shows that, due to a 
lack of competition, Russian firms do not have proper incentives to implement the 
changes necessary to increase productivity. 
Our paper provides further evidence in this direction. Using industrial firms 
Registry data we estimate production function in 83 industries. We then tested 
whether or not certain factors have positive or negative effects on total factor 
productivity in domestic firms. These factors include competition with foreign trade 
and foreign direct investment; the availability of imported materials; and the presence 
of foreign direct investments in vertically related sectors. Our results show that in the 
industries exposed to higher competition from imports and foreign direct investment, 
total productivity grew faster (or declined slower) than in other industries. We 
interpret this result as suggesting that competition with foreign goods forces domestic 
firms to restructure more quickly. 
An additional explanation is based on the notion of a demonstration effect. In 
the Soviet Union, the central planning agencies considered industries which produced 
consumer goods to be unimportant; therefore, such industries were underdeveloped 
and produced goods of low quality. After trade liberalization, some of these industries 
experienced a particularly high inflow of imports. In order to survive in the new 
                                                                                                                                                                      
3 Strictly speaking, the overall volumes of both export and import declined in Russia in mid-1990s in 
comparison to late 1980s. This decline can be fully attributed to the decline in output. 
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situation, Russian firms started copying foreign products. This mode of development 
was especially successful in the food industry. We call this source of increase in 
firms’ productivity the demonstration effect. 
In addition to effects from competition in the same industry, we observe 
positive vertical effects. In the first part of the sample (1996-1998), firms using many 
imported components were more productive than other firms. In the 1999-2000 we 
observed a negative effect on the efficiency from using imported inputs. Given that in 
mid-1998 the ruble depreciated by about 50%, a negative effect of foreign produced 
components is not surprising. Depreciation boosted the costs of foreign produced 
inputs and, therefore, made firms relied on these inputs non-competitive for a while. 
In the 2000-2001 the negative effect had already become insignificant. 
Case study evidence suggests that FDI can have a positive effect on domestic 
suppliers. Competition among domestic firms to become a supplier of foreign-owned 
firms forces domestic firms to restructure. Also there are cases of a direct influence: 
IKEA, for example, invested in some of its suppliers in Russia (Smirnova (2002)). We 
constructed a test to detect the presence of this effect in the case of Russian 
manufacturing firms. The results confirm the hypothesis of a positive effect in the 
overall sample and in before- and after-crisis sub-samples. 
The paper finds that productivity growth in response to competition with 
imports is less pronounced in industries with more complex technologies. The 
breaking down of inter-firm relationships and the lack of coordination among 
vertically related firms, as well as search problems, can account for this result.4 At the 
same time we find that industries with complex technologies started to catch up with 
others after the 1998 crisis.  
 This paper is organized as follows: section 1 begins with a description of the 
data; section 2 discusses the methodology, the results of the estimation of production 
function and the computation of firm-level total factor productivity growth (TFP); 
section 3 evaluates the effect of competition with imports and foreign direct 
investment (FDI) in TFP; section 4 concludes. 
 
                                                           
4 Blanchard and Kremer (1997) and Roland and Verdier (1999) noticed that decline in more complex 
industries in Russia was deeper, and attributed this phenomenon to disorganization problems in the 
Russian economy. 
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Data  
Our data come from three major sources. The firm-level information on output, 
employment, capital, costs of production, and wages are taken from the statistical 
information dataset, which was collected by Goskomstat at the Russian Industrial 
Firms Registry. Further, some of the data are taken from the Alba dataset and the 
Gnosis dataset, which have similar origins but cover different areas. The Alba data set 
also contains the balance sheets of the firms. The Gnosis data set includes major rows 
of the balance sheets, in addition to a standard set of variables of the Russian 
Industrial Firms Registry. In principle, all firms with more than 100 employees, as 
well as smaller firms with 75% of individual ownership are supposed to submit the 
corresponding forms to Goskomstat. Unfortunately, Goskomstat does not have 
enough enforcement power to compel all the firms to supply the data.5 As a result, 
many firms do not provide information to the Goskomstat. New firms are particularly 
underrepresented in the dataset, although old firms are more frequently dropping out 
of it. The largest firms are also not in the dataset; information on them was either not 
included in the original dataset or it was dropped, due to the fact that they seemed to 
be outliers. The data we have are for 1995-2001. The number of firms differs from 
year to year; many firms that were in the sample in the early years dropped out of the 
dataset by the end of the period. It is unclear, though, whether firms dropped from the 
sample because they closed or because they simply ceased reporting information to 
Goskomstat. Since closure of medium and large old firms was a rare phenomenon in 
Russia in the 1990s, we believe that in most cases firms just stopped reporting to the 
Goskomstat. 
Due to this problem with our dataset, we are unable to make any correction for 
firms exit, as in Pavcnik (1999). This means that our sample may be biased, but the 
direction of this bias is unclear. While exiting firms are most likely less productive 
than those continuing to operate, it is difficult to assess the quality of firms that 
stopped reporting. We can assume that the productivity of the firms remaining in the 
dataset is higher than that of exiting firms. It seems natural that younger and more 
successful management can decide to stop reporting to the Goskomstat, while old 
management will continue doing so by habit. 
                                                           
5 Currently, Goskomstat considers switching of firm-level statistics collection from Census form to a 
survey form. 
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Another problem with this dataset is underreporting of output. In an attempt to 
hide profits, firms tend to underreport sales and to report costs that are higher than 
they are in reality. After several interactions with tax inspectors, some corrections for 
this underreporting can be made. However Goskomstat’s report includes the first draft 
of firms’ reports; hence, underreporting could be substantial in our dataset as a result. 
Unfortunately, nothing can be done to correct for this underreporting. We have to 
assume that underreporting is randomly distributed among all types of firms, which 
may be not a very good assumption. 
Overall, the dataset seems to be biased toward old and non-restructured firms. 
In Figure 3, we report the real value added to the firms from the sample. While 
countrywide official statistics report high growth rates from 1999-2001, most of our 
firms do not demonstrate output growth in 2000. 
 Information on foreign-owned firms, including information on the size of the 
foreign stake and country of origin of the foreign investor, comes from the Registry of 
Joint Ventures for 1995-2000, which was also collected by Goskomstat. Before 1998, 
all foreign firms were present in this census, but since 1998 only firms with more than 
100 employees remained in the dataset. 
 The main source of data on foreign trade volumes and prices of imported 
goods is the State Customs Committee Yearbook. This Yearbook contains 
information on goods imports and exports, both in value terms and in physical 
quantities by country of origin and destination. In many cases, information on prices 
is also available.  Since 1995, these data have been compiled from customs 
declarations. In the case of imports, price and in some cases volume information, is 
not particularly reliable, even in the later years. Customs in Russia are corrupt, and 
Russian importers tend to bribe corrupt officials and underestimate the value of their 
imports in order to save on import duties and value added tax. In the mid-1990s, a 
very common way of cheating was to assign goods to a category, which fell into a 
smaller tariff rate (turkey instead of chicken, for example). Tariff rates were recently 
unified, by and large, and the nature of cheating changed. At present, Russian customs 
publish minimum prices at which goods can be imported. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that these minimum prices are mainly used in customs declarations as prices 
of purchase. Due to cheating, price information in State Customs Committee data 
often has little relation to reality, and import volumes are severely underreported. The 
size of underreporting is estimated to be anywhere between 20 (in the mirror 
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statistics) to 80 (according to anecdotal evidence) percent.6 As in the case of 
production, we cannot correct for underreporting, and we must assume that it does not 
seriously depend on goods characteristics. We mainly use trade statistics to compute 
import ratio to production volumes. Since both the numerator and the denominator 
suffer from underreporting, the resulting ratios may not be far from the true ratios.  
For most goods, import and export data are available in 4-digit HS 
classification, and for a large number of goods we have 6 (or even 9) digit HS data. 
One of the most complicated data problems for this paper was matching trade and 
firm-level data. Firm data contain the code of the industry, to which the firm belongs, 
which is assigned according to the Soviet-Developed OKONH industry classification. 
These codes were sometimes assigned in the beginning of 90s and may not reflect 
actual production structure of the firms. Therefore, we had to use firm-level data on 
the range of goods produced in each firm to construct the correspondence code 
between the two databases and to construct the shares of imports in industry 
production. Information on prices is often not reliable; hence, we used physical 
volumes whenever possible to construct the shares of imports in production. The 
appendix describes the matching procedure in more detail. Since both trade statistics 
and firm level statistics on the range of goods produced contain several missing 
variables, we had to fill in some of the missing variables with the numbers for 
neighboring years. Without this procedure, the range of goods on which ratios of 
import to production are computed would have been very unstable from year to year. 
We use the ratios of import to production with filled missing values in our 
computations. 
Input-output matrices, price data, regional characteristics, industrial 
production and other data were obtained from various Goskomstat publications.  
Production Function Estimation 
Following the literature, we obtained firm-level TFP data by estimating production 
function. We computed value added using data on sales, total costs of production, and 
wage bill. In the Alba and Gnosis datasets we have information on costs of production 
that are reported as a proportion of output. Unfortunately, this information for 1998 is 
absent from all datasets we used. We constructed the cost data for 1998 using the cost 
data for 1997 and information on the share of imported components from the input-
                                                           
6 Kozlov (2002) describes functioning of Russian customs, and presents different estimates of 
underreporting. 
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output matrix for 1995. Since the devaluation of the ruble happened in the second half 
of 1998, we assume that most of the firms did not have time to adjust inputs structure, 
i.e. to replace imported inputs with domestic inputs, by the end of the year. The value 
of imported inputs in 1997 was obtained by multiplying 1997 costs of inputs by the 
shares of imported inputs, which were taken from the 1995 input-output matrix for the 
corresponding industry. Domestic inputs were computed as a difference between total 
material inputs and imported inputs. To compute the costs of production in 1998, we 
multiplied the domestic part of intermediate inputs by the 1998 industrial-producer 
price index, and we multiplied the imported part by the 1998 year-average exchange 
rate. 
 All information in the Industrial firms’ census dataset is in current rubles. To 
make the data comparable across years we constructed deflators for each 5-digit 
OKONH industry.7 Yearly deflators were constructed by weighting monthly PPIs by 
monthly industrial production, as reported by Goskomstat. Capital deflators were 
obtained in a different manner. The value of a firm’s capital stock is subject to 
revaluation as of the 1st of January. Hence, the reported figures on the end-of-year 
and beginning-of-year value of capital stocks differ by the revaluation coefficient. We 
computed these revaluation coefficients and used them as deflators for the capital 
stock. 
 The production functions are estimated separately in each of the 83 industries. 
The list of industries and the number of firms are reported in Table 1. Production 
function coefficients can differ across these groups of industries. We chose a translog 
production function specification because it allows for non-linearities of factor inputs, 
which are likely to be present on the industry level. The estimated equation has the 
following form: 
tKtLKL
tLKtKLVA
tKttLtttLK
tttLLtKKttKtLt
⋅+⋅++
+++++++=
lnlnlnln
)(ln)(lnlnlnln 2220
ααα
ααααααα
 
Where: VA refers to value added, L stands for the year average employment, K is the 
year average level of capital. We estimated the equations using OLS, fixed and 
random effect specifications. We dropped outliers (1% of observations from each 
side) from the estimation sample. As we mentioned before, we cannot control for 
selection bias due to exit of firms from business and from the dataset due to non-
reporting. However, there are arguments for assuming that all types of firms (both 
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more and less productive than the average ones) may drop out from the dataset, so we 
hope that the bias due to non-correction is not large. 
In Figure 1 we report changes in the marginal products of labor and capital; 
elasticities of the value added over labor and capital ( tL,η , tK ,η ) averaged over 2-digit 
OKONH industries. We used random effect estimation results to construct the graph, 
although the results of other estimation methods are very similar to this. As shown in 
the graph, our estimated coefficients of the production function are quite plausible. 
Capital elasticity is usually quite low, while labor elasticity is quite high. The 
elasticities are more or less stable across years. 
The TFP growth rates were then calculated using the following procedure, 
suggested in Jorgenson (1995): 
)ln()ln()ln()ln( 1111 ttLttKtttt LLKKVAVAAA ++++ −−= ηη  
where  2)( ,1, tKtKK ηηη += + , 2)( ,1, tLtLL ηηη += + , 
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The estimates of TFP produced from fixed effect, random effect and OLS 
estimations of production function are quite similar. The correlation coefficient 
between TFP growth rates obtained from different methods is above 96%. 
TFP declined across all firms and industries from 1996 to 1998 (see Figure 2). 
In 1999, TFP increased sharply in almost all industries with the exception of the food 
industry. This trend was followed by a decline in the year 2000 of TFP in metallurgy, 
chemical and petrochemical, timber and paper, and food industries (i.e. in industries 
with a high proportion of export-oriented production).  This trend was also followed 
by a reduction of growth rates in electricity and fuel, machinery, and light industries. 
This result seems to be at odds with the official statistics, which report very high 
growth rates in 2000 in all sectors, including in export-oriented sectors. We 
mentioned above that the largest firms were not included in the sample. It is possible 
that, while the largest, restructured exporting firms were growing in 1999, the middle-
sized firms, included in our sample, were not yet able to adjust to real appreciation, 
which started in that year. For 2001, we observed TFP growth in almost all industries. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
7 Some of the industries correspond to 4-digit, rather than 5-digit industries. 
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With the exception of 2000, TFP dynamics that we report are similar to those obtained 
in the studies based on macro data (Dolinskaya (2001)). 
Effects of foreign trade and FDI on Russian firms. 
The abolition of the state monopoly in trade in the early 1990s resulted in a significant 
increase in foreign competition for most Russian manufacturing firms. As our 
computations (see Table 2.1) show, by the mid 1990s, the ratio of import to 
production was particularly high in industries producing consumer goods (textile, 
furniture, electronics and some machine-building industries), where the quality of the 
goods produced by Russian firms was seriously lagging behind international 
standards. Domestic production of some consumer goods declined dramatically, and 
in some cases firms changed their specialization or closed down.8 At the same time, in 
many cases, the increase in foreign competition was accompanied by massive 
improvements in the quality of goods produced by domestic firms, and the appearance 
of new domestic firms, which were able to successfully compete with foreign 
producers.9  
 The main question is, of course, which of these two processes dominated, i.e. 
whether most import competing firms had to close down, or were able to restructure. 
Another interesting problem is to find factors, which influence firms’ ability to adjust 
to foreign competition. 
 We begin answering these two questions by presenting some simple graphical 
evidence. We divided all sectors into five groups according to the level of their 
exposure to foreign trade: 
- export oriented (with export share more than 30%, import share less than 30% 
and a low intra-industry trade index),  
- import competing (with import share more than 30%, export share less than 
30% and a low intra-industry trade index),  
- import competing with high import shares (a subgroup  of import competing 
industries with import share more than 80%),  
- with high intra-industry trade (IIT index more than 50%), and  
- non-traded.  
                                                           
8 Russian classification of industries OKONH failed to trace the changes in firms’ specialization. We 
found a lot of cases in our dataset, when firms were mainly producing goods others, than the one, 
which are included in the definition of their OKONH industry. Relatively small ratios of import to 
production in such industries as electronics can be explain by this fact. 
9 Food processing is a good example of such an industry. 
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Figure 3 shows cumulative changes in value added, total factor productivity, 
labor, and capital in the 5 groups of firms. Import-competing firms, particularly those 
located in the sectors with very high import/production ratios, experienced one of the 
highest TFP growth rates among all groups of industries. They tend to outperform 
both exporting and intra-industry trade industries. Industries producing non-traded 
goods outperformed all other industries in 1999, the year following the devaluation, 
but their TFP growth slowed down afterwards, when the real exchange rate started to 
appreciate. This asymmetry between non-traded goods production and import-
competing industries can be explained by the fact that import competing sectors often 
rely heavily on imported inputs. As we report in Table 2.2, our measure of imported 
inputs is twice as high in the case of import-competing sectors than in the case of non-
traded sectors. 
 In addition to liberalization of imports, inflows of foreign direct investment in 
Russia were allowed in the late 1980s. It is well known that Russia is lagging behind 
other transition economies in terms of attracting FDI. Nonetheless, the share of 
production by foreign-owned firms has reached significant amounts, particularly in 
recent years (see Table 2.3). As Yudaeva et al (2003) show, competition with FDI 
plays an important role in improving domestic firms’ productivity, particularly in 
regions with high human capital. Below, we use regression analysis to more formally 
evaluate the effect of increased access to foreign goods on productivity of domestic 
firms. 
Finally, it is often believed, that exporting firms are more efficient, because 
they directly compete in the international market. It is unclear, though whether such 
firm are expected to restructure faster than other firms. Since they are already more 
efficient, they may need smaller improvements in the future. 
 
Regression results 
To get more precise evidence on the effect of trade openness and liberalization of FDI 
on Russian firms, we used regression analysis. We tested for the effect of the 
following variables: 
1. Competition with imports, measured by the ratio of import to production of the 
same good. The effect of competition can be both positive and negative. The 
former result is possible, when competition forces domestic firms to 
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restructure, and the latter result implies that competition mainly leads to 
driving domestic firms out of the market. 
2. Competition with FDI, measured by the share of production of foreign-owned 
firms in the total production of the industries, in a breakdown available in 
input-output matrix. As in the case with the effect of import competition, this 
effect can be both positive and negative. 
3. The availability of imported inputs. For each firm, we compute a proxy of this 
effect using the following formula:  ∑=
j
jiji ioshiimi ,*  
where imii  is the share of imported inputs in total inputs, used in production of 
industry i, shij is the import/production ratio in industry j, ioi,j is the share of 
industry j in the total inputs, used in industry i. The ioi,j coefficients are taken 
from the input-output matrix.10 
4. The presence of foreign-owned firms in the industries, producing inputs for 
the domestic firm. As in the case of imported inputs, we expect this effect to 
be positive: the better the inputs, the better is the quality of the final product, 
and, therefore, the higher is the TFP of the firm. The proxy for this effect is 
computed using a formula similar to the one for the availability of imported 
inputs proxy. 
5. The presence of foreign-owned firms in the industries, which consume 
products of the firm (consuming industries). Several case studies (Smirnova 
(2002), Keren and Ofer (2000)) demonstrated that entry of foreign-owned 
firms leads to improvements in the quality of suppliers. The effect can be 
indirect: in order to supply goods to the foreign firm, domestic producers 
attempt to increase the quality of their products. The direct influence, when a 
foreign producer invests in its suppliers or helps them with improvements of 
the design of their products, has also been observed in Russia. We computed a 
proxy for this effect using the following formula: ∑=
j
jiji iocshfdifdic ,* , 
where fdici is the proxy for FDI in the industries, which use products of 
industry i as inputs, shfdij is the share of production by foreign-owned firms in 
                                                           
10 Earlier on, we mentioned that input-output matrix contain information on the share of imported 
inputs. Unfortunately, this information exists only in a very aggregated form, i.e. for 2 digit industries. 
In addition, input-output matrixes are not computed every year. Therefore, we prefer to include in 
regression equation indirect measure of imported inputs 
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industry j, and iocij is the share of production of industry i , used as inputs in 
industry j.  
Unfortunately, we were able to compute this proxy only for the industrial 
foreign-owned firms. It would be extremely interesting exercise to do it for the 
service sector, if the corresponding data on domestic firms were available. 
6. Exporting activities of the firm. We use firm export/output ratio to measure the 
intensity of foreign trade operations. Unfortunately, this variable may suffer 
from severe underestimation. Firm level data have information on exporting 
activities only for 1996-97. In the later years, we used custom declaration 
statistics to obtain the value of exports. Many, or even most of Russian firms 
rely on intermediaries in their exporting activities. Custom statistics does not 
trace goods to the producer, and, therefore, export data we use suffer from 
underreporting.  
Other control variables were included in the regression equation because of the 
following consideration. It may be more difficult for large firms to improve their TFP 
(or they may face higher pressure from the local government to not decrease labor), 
and we tried to measure this effect by including log of employment in the regression. 
In the case of capital-intensive production processes, improvements in TFP may 
require higher investment in capital, and this effect is controlled for by including the 
capital-labor ratio. Industry structure can have an effect on firm’s incentives to 
restructure (Brown Earle (2000), Djankov and Murrell (2001)). In particular, 
monopolies or firms facing less domestic competition can have weaker incentives to 
restructure. There are two proxies for this effect in our regressions: a 5-digit industry 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index and the share of the firm in total sales of its 5-digit 
industry and region. Both measures could be included in the regressions since the 
correlation between them is quite low (around 0.3). We used the coefficient of 
variance of PPI in the industry as a measure of uncertainty. Finally, we included PPI 
in the industry with a combination of year dummies for controlling for exchange rate 
changes. Sectoral dummies are also included in all specifications. 
 As a dependent variable, we used TFP estimates, obtained using a random 
effects estimation procedure. Equations are estimated using random effects and 
instrumental variables random effects estimation methods. As instruments for import 
competition, quality of intermediate inputs and export to output ratio, we used their 
lags. Tables 3-4 report the results. Since we do not have FDI data for 2001, we report 
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separately results for 1996-2001 without controls for FDI, and for 1996-2000 with 
controls for FDI. In the overall sample 1996-2001, all import-related effects are 
positive and significant in both specifications (Table 4, columns 1-2). However, the 
results of estimation of this equation in sub-samples for 1994-1998 and 1999-2001 are 
somewhat different. In the sub-sample for the earlier period, most of which precedes 
the 1998 financial crisis in Russia, competition with imports is insignificant, while the 
imported inputs variable is positive and highly significant. In the post-crisis period, 
import competition became positive and significant, while the effects of imported 
components became negative and significant. This later result can be easily explained 
by the devaluation of the ruble, which happened in 1998: foreign-produced inputs 
became too expensive, and firms that relied on such inputs lost some of their 
competitiveness in comparison to firms relying on domestic inputs only. This negative 
effect tends to disappear quickly, though. In the sample for 2000-2001, the 
coefficients at imported inputs are much smaller than in the 1999-2001 sample, and 
they are insignificant.11 Interestingly, the export/output variable is insignificant, and in 
some specifications it is negative, such as in the 1999-2001 sub-period. This may be 
related to the construction of the variable: as we mentioned above, it suffers from 
underreporting. Alternatively, our results may suggest that average-sized exporting 
firms benefited from devaluation less then the larger ones. 
In Table 4 we report the results for 1996-2000, where we included proxies for 
competition and vertical relationships with foreign-owned firms. In the overall period, 
spillovers from FDI in the same industry were positive and significant at the 10% 
level. In the first sub-period, spillovers were positive, highly significant, and larger in 
the absolute values than in the overall period. In the second sub-period spillovers 
remained positive, but became insignificant. This finding is difficult to explain; it may 
be related to the fact that some foreign-owned firms closed after the 1998 crisis. 
Spillovers from foreign-owned firms to import-competing firms were negative but 
insignificant in the first sub-period, while they became positive, but still insignificant, 
in the second sub-period. Surprisingly, the coefficient at the share of FDI among 
suppliers is always negative and significant. At the same time, FDI in consumers is 
positive and significant in all specifications and sub-periods. This result corresponds 
to anecdotal evidence on the positive effect of FDI on downstream industries in 
transition countries.  
                                                           
11 Results of this estimation are not reported in the paper, but available upon request. 
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For firms in import-competing industries the coefficient at FDI share among 
consumers was negative and significant in the before-crisis sub-sample and became 
positive and significant in 1999-2001, which could be easily explained by the fact that 
foreign-owned firms switched to inputs produced by Russian firms after the ruble 
devaluation. 
 In all regressions, the coefficients at the control variables almost always 
coincide with our intuition. Productivity growth in larger firms and firms with higher 
capital/labor ratios was smaller than in other firms. Firms in the sectors with larger 
market shares experienced higher growth of productivity, while in most of cases the 
concentration ratio is negatively related to productivity. For some reason, higher 
variance of PPI corresponds to higher productivity growth.  
Complexity and reaction to competition 
It is well known that during the transition period Russian specialization was 
increasingly shifting towards primary goods production and away from production of 
more complex products. Blanchard and Kremer (1997) attributed this relatively 
deeper decline in more complex industries to the disorganization of the Russian 
economy. They claim that in more complex industries, the breaking down of 
relationships between firms had a more detrimental effect on growth than in the less 
complex ones. Roland and Verdier (1999) suggest that search problems are more 
complicated in more complex industries, which can also affect their output pattern. 
Additionally, we can claim that in more complex industries, restructuring can be 
slower because it requires the coordination of restructuring efforts of many firms.  
We tested whether restructuring in response to import and FDI competition 
was slower in more complex industries. The level of complexity was computed from 
input-output matrixes using methodology, suggested by Blanchard and Kremer 
(1997). We included in the regression the complexity variable itself and its cross-term 
with other dependent variables. Interestingly, the complexity index itself is positive, 
and almost always significant in all specifications and sub-periods (Table 5). The only 
exception is instrumental variables regression for the first sub-period, when this 
variable is negative, but insignificant, and negative and close to significance in the 
import competing sub-sample. Thus, we found weak evidence that complex industries 
were indeed restructuring slower prior to the 1998 crisis, while afterwards they started 
to catch up. The coefficient at the cross-term between complexity index and import 
output ratio is negative and sometimes significant, or positive and insignificant in all 
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specifications. This finding suggests that, indeed, for complex industries it is more 
difficult to coordinate and to restructure in the presence of import competition. 
 
Conclusions 
In view of the forthcoming Russian accession to the WTO, the issue of the effects of 
trade liberalization on the Russian economy became a common topic of discussion. A 
number of economists, politicians, and businessmen claim that only strengthening 
protection, instead of further liberalization of foreign trade, will help to restructure the 
Russian economy. This paper provides evidence to the contrary: increased 
competition with foreign goods or goods produced by foreign firms leads to faster 
restructuring of domestic firms, either because of improved incentives or because of 
better opportunities for reverse engineering, or both. Unfortunately, this effect is not 
yet true in the case of complex industries. However, other things equal, industries 
with more complex technological processes started to grow faster than other sectors 
after 1998 crisis. 
 There are a number of other factors, which help to increase the benefits of 
trade and FDI liberalization. The list of such policies includes improvements in the 
financial sector, regional bureaucracy, and labor mobility. More research is needed to 
reveal the influence of these factors on the ability of firms to restructure.  
 The 1998 crisis weakened the position of firms that relied on foreign-produced 
inputs or worked for foreign-owned companies. This factor did not allow us to give a 
decisive answer on the question of how important these two channels are for 
improvements in Russian firms’ TFP. Evidence from the later periods will help to 
shed light on this issue. 
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Appendix: Construction of import/output ratios. 
We used firm level data on the physical volumes and values of production of 
each commodity to construct firm-specific import/production ratios. By comparing 
commodity names, we constructed correspondence between domestic production and 
HS classification of import for each good. Then individual I/P ratios were computed 
separately for each good. For homogeneous commodities physical volumes were 
used. When information on physical volumes was not available, I/P ratios were 
computed in monetary terms (if available). 
At the next step we computed firm-level I/P ratio by weighting individual 
commodity ratios by the degree of presence of particular commodities in enterprise’s 
output. This weighting procedure can suffer from endogeneity problem, if enterprises 
change their production pattern in response to changing import pressure. The only 
change in variability of I/P ratio should be the change in individual I/P ratios of each 
commodity. To overcome endogeneity problem, weights should not change from year 
to year. Hence, we summed up production of each good over all years for every firm, 
and then computed weights of each good produced using this aggregate production 
levels. We used 1999 export prices to sum up commodities reported in real terms with 
those in monetary terms. 
I/P ratios for industries were constructed in a similar way to I/P ratios of firms. 
In this case, volumes of goods produced were summed up for the entire industry. 
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Table 1 
Industry List and Number of Firms in the Sample1 
Code Industry Name 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
 Energy and Fuel 
1 Electricity 429 398 292 377 733 345 672
2 Oil and gas 89 80 56 68 166 68 137
3 Coal 168 116 87 79 161 85 147
4 Peat 77 47 35 29 57 36 41
 Metallurgy 
5 Ferrous 234 190 121 116 217 151 210
6 Non-ferrous 103 67 43 0 85 48 66
 Chemical and petrochemical 
7 Chemical 403 280 179 180 381 224 333
8 Petrochemical 136 94 75 66 118 81 110
 Machinery 
9 Equipment for energy sector and metallurgy 77 61 44 47 90 51 80
10 Mining equipment 40 39 30 29 41 33 48
11 Lifting and transportation machinery 75 61 26 32 74 57 76
12 Railroads machinery 51 46 29 44 57 38 55
13 Electro-technical equipment 385 305 195 223 367 258 429
14 Equipment for chemical and oil machinery 130 114 74 75 124 102 139
15 Machine-tool construction 136 92 61 70 104 81 117
16 Tool-making industry 114 84 54 70 130 62 136
17 Equipment for inter-industry production activities 84 60 33 36 87 40 98
18 Instrument-making industry and computer engineering 246 194 119 131 223 146 222
19 Automobile and bearings industries 234 179 128 118 256 154 297
20 Tractors and agricultural machinery 202 122 104 76 178 131 182
21 Equipment for road construction and public utilities sectors 186 129 85 79 155 118 163
22 Textiles equipment 60 44 21 29 46 25 51
23 Equipment for food industry and mixed fodder industry 82 64 35 35 67 49 66
24 Other technological equipment and household devices and machines 77 50 35 32 64 30 72
25 Sanitary and gas equipment 88 62 37 40 80 42 86
26 Aircraft industry 82 68 41 8 0 2 8
27 Defense industry 129 115 74 3 0 7 20
28 Shipbuilding industry 87 72 47 2 0 3 5
29 Radio industry 86 70 39 2 0 0 4
30 Communication means industry 75 58 29 4 0 2 8
31 Electronic industry 185 139 80 4 0 21 30
32 Other machinery industries 69 46 28 1 0 8 7
33 Production of metal constructions 177 127 72 48 129 87 150
34 Production of assembled buildings and metal goods 258 164 111 97 217 140 239
35 Metal goods for non-production use 81 46 22 34 59 36 56
36 Repair of machinery and equipment 1,723 1,206 785 787 1,536 882 1,286
 Timber, paper and woodworking industry 
37 Timber cutting industry 1,064 702 424 414 875 370 584
38 Timber (sawing) industry 255 145 97 90 220 86 222
39 Timber processing industry (not incl. sawing) 294 177 114 126 253 123 249
40 Production of furniture 523 291 179 170 348 206 320
41 Other timber processing industries 87 50 35 36 66 40 63
42 Cellulose paper, and timber-chemical industry 175 122 81 76 152 106 142
                                                 
1 In most cases, industry in this list correspond to a 5-digit OKONH industries. Although, if the number 
of firms in a 5-gidit industry was too small, several 5-digit industries were combined into one industry. 
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Table 1 (continued) 
Code Industry Name 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
 Construction materials industry 
43 Cement, asbestos-cement goods and soft roofing and hydro-isolating materials industry 83 65 46 51 77 67 80
44 Assembled reinforced concrete and concrete constructions and products industry 799 554 345 291 537 373 564
45 Wall materials industry 566 368 252 276 412 223 411
46 Construction ceramics and polymeric materials industry 49 43 16 25 62 26 69
47 Non-ore construction materials industry 235 158 118 136 196 125 201
48 Facing materials, porous fillers, lime and gyps materials industry 135 94 59 75 108 59 112
49 Heat-isolating materials, asbestos, materials from non-metal ores industry 139 106 59 68 123 59 132
50 Glassware, chinaware, faience industry 133 92 69 80 120 78 105
 Light industry 
51 Primary processing of flax and wool 127 57 42 25 86 76 92
52 Cotton, linen, wool and silk industries 288 186 121 93 241 175 264
53 Non-woven materials, hemp, net-making industry 
49 40 17 16 37 32 38
54 Fancy goods textile 46 36 14 21 38 33 36
55 Knitted wear industry 266 149 86 72 193 109 182
56 Felting industry 49 28 25 27 39 24 37
57 Sewing industry 1,302 876 611 468 1,168 635 1,075
58 Leather industry 118 79 51 32 85 59 89
59 Fur industry 56 36 36 21 56 26 50
60 Footwear industry 253 166 106 72 226 105 211
61 Other textiles 48 31 24 19 42 32 41
 Food industry 
62 Sugar industry 85 44 28 39 71 57 73
63 Baking industry 1,502 1,086 787 672 1,172 765 1,015
64 Confectionery industry 290 186 118 187 204 120 175
65 Pasta making 58 41 28 34 49 31 50
66 Oil and fat industry 78 54 37 44 69 52 79
67 Fragrance and cosmetics 26 14 6 9 25 20 26
68 Spirits industry 90 75 42 43 81 61 99
69 Liqueur and vodka industry 105 85 72 92 163 79 162
70 Wine industry 91 58 41 36 94 54 82
71 Beer industry 185 120 93 109 158 96 157
72 Non-alcohol beverages industry 80 40 25 27 84 32 92
73 Fruit and vegetable industry 172 94 80 76 153 87 127
74 Other food industries 122 94 60 61 118 81 118
75 Meat and poultry industry 524 353 223 127 363 202 383
76 Butter, cheese and milk industry 1,283 698 561 422 903 661 860
77 Fish industry 288 187 100 72 211 80 172
 Other 
78 Microbiology industry 25 24 19 17 27 25 26
79 Flour-grinding and cereals industry 257 226 150 105 257 178 246
80 Mixed fodder industry 147 114 56 50 139 98 119
81 Medical industry 143 130 87 122 175 99 161
82 Polygraphic industry 886 748 514 686 779 611 683
83 Other industrial productions 486 380 242 292 516 277 456
 Total 20,920 14,591 9,722 9,173 17,573 10,656 16,576
 
  22
Table 2.1 
Ratios of Import to Output by Firm 
 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
mean 0.20 0.24 0.27 0.24 0.21 0.20 0.28Import Competing 
st. dev. 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.19
mean 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.14Export Oriented 
st. dev. 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.18
mean 0.16 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.25 0.28 0.29High Intra-Industry 
Trade  st. dev. 0.20 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.21 0.23
mean 0.10 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.13Non Traded 
st. dev. 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.19 0.19 0.21
mean 0.33 0.44 0.44 0.41 0.36 0.34 0.42Import Competing with 
High Import Share st. dev. 0.23 0.28 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.24 0.27
mean 0.16 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.21Total 
st. dev. 0.19 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.23
 
Table2.2  
Share of Imported Inputs by Industry 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
mean 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.17Import Competing 
st. dev. 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.05
mean 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.10Export Oriented 
st. dev. 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.06
mean 0.10 0.14 0.15 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.17High Intra-Industry 
Trade  st. dev. 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06
mean 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.12Non Traded 
st. dev. 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05
mean 0.14 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.21Import Competing with 
High Import Share st. dev. 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.07 0.06 0.07
mean 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.14Total 
st. dev. 0.05 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.07
Table 2.3  
Share of Foreign-Owned Firms Production in the Total 
Production by Industry 
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
mean 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.11 0.17Import Competing 
st. dev. 0.09 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.16
mean 0.13 0.13 0.18 0.20 0.34Export Oriented 
st. dev. 0.12 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.15
mean 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.23 0.19High Intra-Industry 
Trade  st. dev. 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.24 0.19
mean 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.10 0.14Non Traded 
st. dev. 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.15 0.17
mean 0.07 0.09 0.12 0.15 0.21Import Competing with 
High Import Share st. dev. 0.08 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.17
mean 0.05 0.06 0.08 0.12 0.17Total 
st. dev. 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.17
 
Table2.4  
Complexity 
  
mean 0.73Import Competing 
st. dev. 0.19
mean 0.72Export Oriented 
st. dev. 0.10
mean 0.81High Intra-Industry 
Trade  st. dev. 0.09
mean 0.77Non Traded 
st. dev. 0.13
mean 0.82Import Competing with 
High Import Share st. dev. 0.12
mean 0.76Total 
st. dev. 0.15
 
  23
Table 3 
Total Factor Productivity Growth Regressions. Panel random effects.  
 All Industries Import Competing Industries 
1996-2001 1996-1998 1999-2001 1996-2001 1996-1998 1999-2001 
Variables [1] [2] IV [3] [4] IV [5] [6] IV [7] [8] IV [9] [10] IV [11] [12] IV 
-0.023 -0.022 -0.033 -0.046 -0.015 -0.013 -0.018 -0.016 -0.023 -0.017 -0.007 -0.003 log employment 
[5.84]** [5.89]** [5.98]** [3.41]** [2.52]* [2.49]* [2.82]** [2.48]* [2.43]* [0.23] [0.74] [0.29] 
-0.039 -0.036 -0.043 -0.037 -0.033 -0.027 -0.036 -0.036 -0.045 -0.043 -0.019 -0.016 capital/output ratio 
[16.94]** [16.11]** [15.30]** [13.78]** [7.42]** [6.64]** [9.97]** [9.96]** [9.80]** [6.74]** [2.80]** [2.47]* 
-0.063 0.164 -0.087 0.184 -0.046 0.108 -0.042 0.187 -0.123 0.320 0.030 -0.031 lagged market share by 
region and industry [4.37]** [2.42]* [4.12]** [1.50] [2.17]* [1.25] [2.11]* [1.63] [3.93]** [1.62] [0.99] [0.21] 
0.185 -0.054 0.316 -0.071 0.147 -0.025 0.189 -0.042 0.347 -0.127 -0.013 0.046 national Herfindalh index
[2.58]** [3.95]** [2.67]** [3.40]** [1.54] [1.32] [1.66] [2.10]* [1.77] [3.19]** [0.09] [1.66] 
0.122 0.120 2.076 1.895 0.094 0.099 0.114 0.115 3.447 3.277 0.071 0.083 coefficient of variance of 
PPI [3.52]** [3.48]** [4.34]** [3.72]** [2.68]** [2.86]** [3.00]** [3.02]** [3.74]** [1.62] [1.85] [2.17]* 
0.096 0.086 0.177 0.141 -0.100 -0.110 0.142 0.144 0.119 0.110 -0.240 -0.237 PPI by industry [4.30]** [3.87]** [3.58]** [2.89]** [3.34]** [3.65]** [4.12]** [4.15]** [1.37] [0.85] [4.75]** [4.68]** 
 0.081  -0.002  0.210  0.021  -0.122  0.241 import shares by firm 
 [2.98]**  [0.06]  [5.15]**  [0.49]  [1.80]  [3.95]** 
0.076  0.029  0.155  0.018  -0.063  0.189  lagged import shares by 
firm [2.77]**  [0.74]  [3.70]**  [0.45]  [1.00]  [3.08]**  
0.200 0.193 0.576 1.011 -1.126 -1.385 0.039 0.016 0.245 0.604 -1.127 -1.436 imported inputs 
[2.21]* [2.03]* [4.80]** [6.12]** [7.14]** [8.97]** [0.32] [0.12] [1.47] [1.06] [5.10]** [6.32]** 
0.043 0.101 0.260 0.857 -0.025 0.031 0.066 0.035 0.186 -0.084 0.013 0.001 export/output ratio [2.72]** [2.58]** [7.76]** [1.69] [1.35] [1.07] [2.82]** [0.54] [4.13]** [0.03] [0.45] [0.04] 
-0.422 -0.424 -0.454 -0.424 0.441 -0.424 -0.409 -0.415 -0.275 -0.335 0.615 0.612 constant [11.52]** [11.57]** [7.05]** [6.13]** [7.18]** [6.13]** [6.30]** [6.22]** [2.23]* [0.92] [5.71]** [5.87]** 
year dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
sectoral dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 47951 47951 25737 25737 22214 25737 19902 19902 10500 10500 9402 9402 
Number of firms 14161 14161 12286 12286 10378 12286 6084 6084 5148 5148 4474 4474 
IV – instrumental variable estimation. Import shares by firm, imported inputs, export/output ratio instrumented by their first lags.  
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table 4 
Total Factor Productivity Growth Regressions. FDI. Panel Random Effects. 
 All Industries Import Competing Industries 
1996-2001 1996-1998 1999-2000 1996-2001 1996-1998 1999-2000 
Variables [1] [2] IV [3] [4] IV [5] [6] IV [7] [8] IV [9] [10] IV [11] [12] IV 
-0.020 -0.020 -0.033 -0.047 0.004 0.004 -0.011 -0.010 -0.024 -0.024 0.018 0.017 log employment 
[4.83]** [4.59]** [5.90]** [3.35]** [0.52] [0.53] [1.54] [1.27] [2.59]** [0.29] [1.54] [1.42] 
-0.038 -0.038 -0.044 -0.037 -0.031 -0.031 -0.040 -0.040 -0.044 -0.045 -0.026 -0.026 capital/output ratio 
[16.1]** [16.0]** [15.4]** [13.9]** [6.04]** [6.02]** [10.2]** [10.2]** [9.62]** [6.97]** [3.13]** [3.22]** 
0.220 0.210 0.283 0.169 0.119 0.110 0.313 0.309 0.408 0.404 -0.062 -0.056 lagged market share by 
region and industry [2.78]** [2.67]** [2.36]* [1.41] [1.02] [0.97] [2.38]* [2.34]* [2.05]* [2.00]* [0.32] [0.30] 
-0.067 -0.065 -0.091 -0.074 -0.041 -0.033 -0.046 -0.047 -0.120 -0.124 0.076 0.080 national Herfindalh 
index [4.27]** [4.18]** [4.29]** [3.44]** [1.52] [1.29] [2.01]* [2.04]* [3.82]** [2.85]** [2.01]* [2.14]* 
0.147 0.152 2.236 2.014 0.127 0.140 0.140 0.142 2.750 2.717 0.139 0.148 coefficient of variance 
of PPI [4.16]** [4.30]** [4.65]** [3.85]** [3.44]** [3.78]** [3.53]** [3.58]** [2.91]** [1.76] [3.36]** [3.59]** 
0.108 0.107 0.169 0.137 -0.106 -0.108 0.148 0.147 0.154 0.151 -0.323 -0.332 PPI by industry 
[4.64]** [4.52]** [3.39]** [2.77]** [3.21]** [3.23]** [4.12]** [4.09]** [1.75] [1.17] [5.82]** [5.96]** 
 0.141  0.015  0.317  0.012  -0.108  0.250 import shares by firm 
 [4.49]**  [0.39]  [5.52]**  [0.24]  [1.51]  [2.90]** 
0.134  0.046  0.275  0.022  -0.047  0.255  lagged import shares by 
firm [4.48]**  [1.13]  [5.30]**  [0.48]  [0.74]  [3.41]**  
0.084 0.088 0.153 0.082 0.069 0.047 -0.069 -0.076 -0.086 -0.146 0.159 0.116 share of FDI 
[1.84] [1.91] [1.98]* [0.97] [1.08] [0.76] [1.07] [1.15] [0.84] [1.28] [1.67] [1.23] 
-0.824 -0.810 -0.486 -0.407 -0.464 -0.508 -1.382 -1.408 0.967 0.608 -1.158 -1.127 share of FDI among 
suppliers [8.55]** [8.45]** [3.03]** [2.21]* [3.06]** [3.44]** [5.66]** [5.61]** [1.75] [0.21] [3.33]** [3.24]** 
0.365 0.360 0.469 0.191 0.391 0.408 0.004 0.022 -1.337 -1.299 1.150 1.224 share of FDI among 
consumers [4.45]** [4.40]** [3.18]** [0.93] [3.63]** [3.89]** [0.03] [0.16] [5.08]** [4.83]** [6.10]** [6.49]** 
0.257 0.246 0.518 0.994 -1.755 -1.715 0.185 0.266 0.145 0.556 -1.049 -0.689 imported inputs 
[2.65]** [2.27]* [4.21]** [5.54]** [8.62]** [8.28]** [1.32] [1.63] [0.83] [1.34] [3.52]** [2.16]* 
0.065 0.083 0.248 0.844 -0.023 -0.022 0.086 0.038 0.194 0.068 0.025 -0.005 export/output ratio [3.62]** [1.53] [7.39]** [1.64] [1.00] [0.66] [3.19]** [0.45] [4.30]** [0.02] [0.61] [0.10] 
-0.407 -0.414 -0.432 -0.403 0.428 0.431 -0.402 -0.418 -0.238 -0.272 0.554 0.502 constant 
[10.4]** [10.2]** [6.57]** [5.82]** [5.29]** [5.32]** [5.59]** [5.66]** [1.89] [0.83] [3.93]** [3.55]** 
year dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
sectoral dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 40334 40334 25737 25737 14597 14597 16611 16611 10500 10500 6111 6111 
Number of firms 13859 13859 12286 12286 9818 9818 5930 5930 5148 5148 4195 4195 
IV – instrumental variable estimation. Import shares by firm, imported inputs, export/output ratio instrumented by their first lags.  
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Table 5 
Total Factor Productivity. Complexity and Competition. Panel Random Effects. 
 All Industries Import Competing Industries 
1996-2001 1996-1998 1999-2001 1996-2001 1996-1998 1999-2001 
Variables [1] [2] IV [3] [4] IV [5] [6] IV [7] [8] IV [9] [10] IV [11] [12] IV 
 0.040  0.296  0.122  -0.155  -0.357  0.982 import shares by firm 
 [0.31]  [1.26]  [0.64]  [0.73]  [0.81]  [3.36]** 
0.136  0.248  0.111  0.198  0.116  0.578  lagged import shares by firm
[2.23]*  [2.78]**  [1.26]  [2.40]*  [1.02]  [4.38]**  
0.088 0.072 0.431 0.876 -1.171 -1.476 0.017 -0.008 0.236 0.912 -1.245 -1.855 imported inputs [0.89] [0.62] [3.33]** [4.63]** [6.64]** [7.64]** [0.14] [0.05] [1.37] [1.42] [5.37]** [7.18]** 
-0.106 0.230 -0.105 10.088 -0.090 0.100 -0.145 3.669 -0.756 28.761 -0.014 0.694 export/output ratio 
[1.75] [2.13]* [0.31] [2.11]* [1.34] [1.07] [0.47] [2.38]* [1.11] [1.90] [0.04] [1.12] 
0.459 0.312 0.593 -0.514 0.422 0.373 0.503 0.170 0.273 -1.852 1.088 1.327 complexity index [3.20]** [2.15]* [2.94]** [0.98] [1.86] [1.71] [2.53]* [0.73] [0.94] [1.90] [3.39]** [4.21]** 
-0.073 -0.046 -0.080 0.148 -0.090 -0.068 -0.086 -0.031 -0.036 0.371 -0.179 -0.183 complexity index multiplied 
by log employment [2.83]** [1.85] [2.20]* [1.26] [2.23]* [1.84] [2.39]* [0.71] [0.67] [1.75] [3.12]** [3.39]** 
0.233 0.210 0.243 0.398 0.292 0.272 0.245 0.220 0.291 0.282 0.195 0.138 complexity index multiplied 
by lagged market share [2.36]* [2.24]* [1.68] [2.37]* [1.99]* [2.06]* [2.01]* [1.79] [1.54] [1.28] [1.06] [0.81] 
-0.002 -0.001 0.024 0.073 -0.008 -0.015 0.023 0.029 0.063 0.172 -0.009 -0.028 complexity index multiplied 
by capital/output ratio [0.14] [0.05] [1.18] [2.47]* [0.25] [0.48] [1.03] [1.27] [2.23]* [2.73]** [0.19] [0.65] 
-0.059 0.072 -0.262 -0.351 0.075 0.129 -0.236 0.257 -0.249 0.486 -0.510 -0.871 complexity index multiplied 
by import shares [0.81] [0.46] [2.47]* [1.20] [0.70] [0.57] [2.38]* [0.99] [1.88] [0.95] [3.20]** [2.49]* 
0.213 -0.176 0.462 -11.751 0.093 -0.094 0.264 -4.504 1.167 -36.082 0.037 -0.856 complexity index multiplied 
by export/output ratio [2.57]* [1.11] [1.09] [1.94] [1.00] [0.74] [0.68] [2.36]* [1.39] [1.97]* [0.08] [1.10] 
-0.744 -0.637 -0.832 -0.056 0.137 0.192 -0.776 -0.571 -0.399 0.820 -0.186 -0.347 constant 
[6.82]** [5.79]** [5.27]** [0.15] [0.78] [1.14] [4.71]** [3.07]** [1.60] [1.38] [0.69] [1.34] 
year dummies  yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
sectoral dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Observations 47951 47951 25737 25737 22214 22214 19902 19902 10500 10500 9402 9402 
Number of firms 14161 14161 12286 12286 10378 10378 6084 6084 5148 5148 4474 4474 
IV – instrumental variable estimation. Import shares by firm, imported inputs, export/output ratio, and their crossterms with complexity index instrumented by their first lags. 
Other control variables are log employment, capital/output ratio, lagged market share by region and industry, national Herfindalh index, coefficient of variance of PPI, PPI 
by industry 
Absolute value of t-statistics in brackets; * significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level 
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Figure 1.  
Marginal Products of Capital and Labor and Capital and Labor Elasticity of Output (Random Effects Estimations) 
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Figure 2.  
Total Factor Productivity Growth 
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Figure 3 
Total Factor Productivity, Real Output, Real Capital and Labor Cumulative Growth by Trade Categories (1996 = 100%) 
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